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ABSTRACT A Leakage-Resilient Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-based Encryption (LR-CP-ABE) not only
supports the fine-grained access control to encrypted data but also guarantees the security of the data under
the side-channel attacks. However, the leakage rate in the existing schemes is low or related to the number
of attributes. It will make these schemes suffer from continual attacks. In addition, all of them almost not
consider the leakage of the users’ privacy and rely on the composite order groups which will threaten the
privacy security of the users and depress the users in practice. In this paper, we aim at solving the above
problems and propose a scheme with the improving leakage rate in the prime order group. In the proposed
scheme, an extension of the lattice-based trapdoor is used to make it achieve the maximum leakage rate
1− o(1). Moreover, it achieves the anonymity which can protect the privacy of the receivers. The proposed
scheme can be reduced to the standard assumption-Decision Linear (DLIN) assumption in the selective
security model and resist the Chosen Plaintext Attacks (CPA security). At last, the performance comparisons
are given to confirm the efficiency and security of the proposed scheme.
INDEX TERMS Leakage rate, anonymity, ciphertext-policy ABE, the maximum leakage rate, CPA security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing [1]–[4] is favored by users and enterprises
for its high speed, flexibility, low investment and reliable
service. However, its dynamics and openness also lead to
security problems, such as data security and privacy pro-
tection. Data leakage incidents have occurred frequently
in recent years. For example, on March 18, 2018, it was
revealed that during the 2016 presidential election, a com-
pany called Cambridge’s Analytica illegally used the personal
data of 50 million users obtained from Facebook to create
archives. Later, Facebook found that up to 87million people’s
information had been improperly shared by the company.
And on May 20, 2019, TechCrunch reported that a database
of Facebook’s photo-sharing website called Instagram was
leaked on the Internet, which contained private information
such as phone numbers and email addresses of nearly 50 mil-
lion users, including some stars and internet celebrities. Such
leakage incidents are fatal.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Petros Nicopolitidis .
In dealing with the data leakage and privacy information
leakage of the users, public key cryptography technique has
occupied a decisive position in the information security sys-
tem. However, the general constructions from the Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) and an Identity-based Encryption (IBE)
[5] are often not realistic or secure in practice. One of the rea-
sons is their one-to-one design principle. And the more com-
plex system which was called Attribute-based Encryption
(ABE) [6] came into being in 2005 as a one-to-many encryp-
tion mechanism. It not only ensures data security but also
supports expressive access control policies because attributes
acts as public keys and associate them with ciphertexts and
users secret keys. An ABE has mainly been classified into
two categories: Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) and Ciphertext-
Policy ABE (CP-ABE) [7]. The other comes from the side-
channel attacks, where the adversaries can obtain the limited
additional information about secret keys and other internal
states. These leakage information may make the existing
works be easily broken. Naturally, the Leakage-Resilient
Encryption mechanism was introduced, which ensured the
security of scheme under the key leakage attacks. To describe
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TABLE 1. Definitions of leakage models.
the amount of leakage bits that the adversaries can know
under these attacks, various leakage models are designed,
such as Only Computation Leakage (OCL) model, the Con-
tinuous Memory Leakage (CML) model and so on. The con-
crete information of the various models are shown in Table 1.
Now the Leakage-Resilient (LR) cryptosystem especially the
LR-ABE has become a research hotspot.
LR-ABE schemes give stronger security guarantees to the
sharing data than general constructions, but most of them
rarely pay attention to protecting the privacy of recipients
from access policies. After an encryptor uploads the specified
access policy to the cloud platform along with the encrypted
data, the adversaries can obtain the attribute information
contained in the access policy directly or through DDH test,
thus obtaining the sensitive information of the receivers,
which really poses a great threat to the privacy of the users.
For the purpose of better protecting users’ privacy and data
security, the concept of Anonymous ABE (ANON-ABE) was
introduced in [8], [9]. In ANON-ABE, the adversaries can-
not grasp the meaningful information of the corresponding




Akavia et al. [10] firstly presented the BML model and
defined an attack model called ‘‘memory attack’’ that solved
the problem of [11], where they considered the amount of
leaked bits that the trapdoor one-way function outputted.
Subsequently, Naor and Segev [12] constructed a Leakage-
Resilient Public Key Encryption (LR-PKE) scheme by utiliz-
ing Hash Proof System (HPS) that was not related to other
complexity assumptions and was as efficient as the under-
lying scheme. They also built two complementary schemes
based on Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and K-Linear
assumptions whose leakage bits could be approach the bit
length of private keys. Moreover, they constructed two LR-
PKE schemes which came from Cramer-Shoup cryptosys-
tem [13]. The corresponding leakage rates are 1/4 and 1/6
respectively.
In [14], Alwen et al. showed the details of LR-PKE/IBE
schemes under the Bounded Retrieval Leakage (BRL) model.
Additionally, a novel concept of IB-HPS was proposed.
Then, they showed that a LR-IBE scheme was derived from
their IB-HPS. Afterwards, Chow et al. [15] introduced
the Leakage-Resilient IBE (LR-IBE) systems under static
assumptions in the standard model. Their proposals were
derived from applying the hash proof technique to IBE
schemes of Boneh-Boyen, Waters and Lewko-Waters. And
their three schemes achieves the leakage rate 1/3, 1/3 and
1/9 respectively in the CPA security model. Lewko et al. [16]
provided IBE, ABE and Hierarchical IBE (HIBE) schemes
under the Continual Memory Leakage (CML) model
described in [17] and [18]. All of their constructions achieve
the leakage-resilience on the master secret keys and private
keys simultaneously.
In 2013, a new LR-PKE scheme was put forward by
Liu et al. [19] to solve the shortcoming of [20] that the
leakage parameter λ is linearly correlated with the length
of the plaintext lm. Specifically, the relationship between λ
and lm is described as λ + lm ≤ log p − ω(log κ), while
the number of leakage bits is λ ≤ log p − ω(log κ) in
the scheme [19], where κ represents the security param-
eter and p is a big prime that denotes the order of the
fundamental group. Then Zhang et al. [21] put forward two
schemes which tolerated the continual leakage in the standard
model. Both constructions of LR-CP-ABE and LR-KP-ABE
schemes achieve fast decryption and the cost of decryption
has nothing to do with the depth of the access structures.
In 2017, the improved LR-CP-ABE and LR-KP-ABE were
introduced by Zhang et al. [22] by employing the HPS to
ABE which were proved to be adaptively secure. In addition,
these two schemes overcome the shortcomings of most of
schemes that the leakage rate is not only related to the size of
the dependent group, but also depends on the leakage parame-
ter of ñ. To protect the privacy of the receivers, the anonymous
LR-ABE was considered in the design process of [23]. The
recent works due to Li et al. [24], [25] were still not given an
ideal leakage rate since the best rate of them was 1/3 when
the depth of the hierarchy was 1.
2) ANONYMOUS ABE
Kapadia et al. [8] defined an ANON-ABE for the first time
which has the following four characteristics: (1) Realize the
data sharing between the data owner with multiple recipients
through a semi-trusted server, which avoids the connection
between the sender and the receiver. (2) Hide the plaintext
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TABLE 2. Performance analyses.
messages and access policies. (3) Any recipients cannot
know the information of the access policies. (4) Support
the non-monotonic boolean access policies. Subsequently,
Yu et al. [9] designed a scheme whose security could be
reduced to the Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman (SXDH)
assumption, in which the anonymity was achieved by hiding
access policy. Then two anonymous schemes were given in
[26]. But both schemes are based on inflexible ANDgates and
only achieved partially hidden. The [27] solved the problem
of illegal sharing the keys among users, which could sup-
port user accountability by embedding additional information
specified by users. However, users must calculate again and
again to test whether they are legitimate users specified by
the encryptor in these schemes. It will greatly increase the
cost of decryption. So Zhang et al. [28] proposed a scheme
with decryption test in 2013, namely, adding a matching
operation with less computation before decryption phase.
The [29] proposed an anonymous scheme based on a prime
order group. In 2016, the [30] extended the ANON-CP-ABE
to the electronic medical record system to protect the users
privacy, in which the access structure was more expressive.
In 2017, the idea of Hidden Vector Encryption (HVE) was
used to detect whether the attribute met the requirements of
legal decryption in scheme [31], where the calculation of
decryption was performed by the cloud server. Additionally,
the obvious difference between this solution and the previous
solution was that the list of coefficients {ωx} was embedded
into the ciphertexts without evaluation. The [32] proposed
an ANON-CP-ABE scheme that supports fast decryption for
Personal Health Record (PHR). The core technology of [29],
[30], [32] is to disclose the index of attribute names and the
attribute values are embed into access structures, so these
schemes only can partially hide the access policies.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
Following the above trend, we aim to solve the problems
of low leakage rate and recipient anonymity in the existing
LR-ABE and proposed a LR-CP-ABE scheme. The detail
contributions are as follows.
1) Higher leakage rate
Technically, the proposed scheme is based on the
Bounded Memory Leakage (BML) model (or Relative
Leakage model), in which the arbitrary information of
the private keys can be obtained and there is a restriction
that the total number of leaked bits cannot exceed λ.
From the viewpoint of security reduction, we are moti-
vated by the LWE-based IBE [33] and the extensions of
it [34], [35]. Select randomly matrices A0,A1 ∈R Z2×l̃p
and set masker keys as msk = 〈A0,A1〉. The system
public parameters are set as pp = 〈gA0 , gA1 ,B, gD〉
where B ∈R Zl̃×l̃p and D ∈R Z2×1p . The pp are different
from LWE-based constructions. In addition, the private
keys and ciphertexts are set as skvi,xi = g
vvi,xi and ci′ =
gǍi′ ·ω·z·F(ρ(i
′)) where i ∈ I and v() is attributes. These
differences make the proposed LR-CP-ABE realize the
maximum leakage rate 1−o(1) based the DLIN assump-
tion. Table 2 shows some comparisons with others.
2) Recipient-anonymity
Anonymous encryption is an effective method to protect
the privacy of the recipient. It requires the adversaries
cannot obtain the information of the private keys from
the ciphertexts under the premise of possessing the
public keys. In most LR-ABE schemes, the sensitive
information about attributes in access policies can be
capture by DDH test when the adversary obtains the
ciphertexts, which will lead to the disclosure of the
user’s privacy. To address this dilemma, we consider
the implementation of the anonymity in the proposed
scheme.
3) High efficiency on prime-order groups
According to the recent articles, a pairing computa-
tion on prime-order groups is more fast than that on
composite ones, where ‘‘a Tate pairing on a 1024-bit
composite-order elliptic curve is roughly 50 times
slower than the same pairing on a comparable prime-
order curve’’. In addition, the decryption cost in schemes
over prime-order groups decreases more than that over
composite-order ones. The proposed scheme is based
on prime order groups which is more efficient than the
available (refer to the Table 5).
C. ORGANIZATION
Arrange the remaining sections according to the following
way. The 2nd part describes some preliminaries, such as
basic notations, LSSS and DLIN assumption. The definitions
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TABLE 3. Meaning of symbols.
and security model of CP-ABE under the BML model are
elaborated in the 3rd part. The 4th portion of article provides
the specific constructions and security proofs. The detailed




In order to facilitate understanding the specific meaning of
symbols, a summary is given in Table 3.
B. LINEAR SECRET SHARING scheme (LSSS)
The specific meaning of linearity in the linear secret shar-
ing scheme 0 composed of attribute sets S is explained as
follows:
• Secret sharing: Ǎ is matrix whose number of rows
and columns are l and n respectively, and this matrix
also named sharing-generating matrix. The i′th row of
Ǎ is connected with an attribute value ρ(i′) for i′ ∈
[l] by a function ρ. Select a random vector ω =
(s, ω2, . . . , ωn)T ∈ Znp, where s stands for the secret
that the data owner wants to share, the l shares of the
secret s are expressed as Ǎω. (Ǎω)i′ ∈ Zp is the share
for attribute value ρ(i′).
• Secret reconstruction: C ∈ 0 represents any authoriza-
tion set, I be defined as I = {i′ : ρ(i′) ∈ C} ⊂
{1, 2, . . . , n}. In polynomial time, such a collection
{µi′}i′∈I can be solved that satisfies
∑
i′∈I µi′λi′ = s if
{λi′}i′∈I are indeed valid shares of secret s.
C. DLIN ASSUMPTION
The original decision linear assumption says that given gx1 and
gy2, it is difficult to distinguish g
x+y from GT , in which x,
y ∈R Zp and g1, g2, g ∈R G. For our purpose, the assumption
described in [34] is converted to given the matrix gA where
A ∈ Z3×l̃p whose rank is 2 or 3 and the number of columns
satisfies the condition l̃ ≥ 3, it is hard to decide the rank
of A. That is to say, under the DLIN assumption, the
advantage |Pr[b′ = b : A0 ∈R Rk2(Z3×l̃p ),A1 ∈R
Rk3(Z3×l̃p ), b ∈R {0, 1}, b′← D(g, gAb )]− 12 | of distinguisher
D is negligible.
Definition 1 (Universal Hash Function): If for any x 6=









whereHĨ = {h : X→ Y} is a family of hash functions, then
we say it is universal.
Lemma 1 (Generalized Leftover Hash Lemma [33]):HĨ =
{h : X→ Y} means a family of universal hash functions and
f : X → Z is a family of leakage functions. The statistical
distance




γ (T) · |Y| · |Z|,
forT ∈R X, γ (T) = maxt Pr[T = t]. That is, if the right-side
of the inequality is negligible, h(T) is still random even if h
and f (T) are given.
Lemma 2 (Leakage-Resilience Random Subspaces [17]):
Let m ≥ l ≥ 4, p is a large prime, X ∈R Zm×lp ,T ∈R
Zl×2p ,Y ∈R Zm×2p and f : Zm×2p → Z. As long as |Z| ≤
ql−3ε2 is satisfied, then there is
SD((X, f (X · T ); (X, f (Y ))) ≤ ε.
D. DEFINITIONS AND SECURITY MODEL FOR
LR-CP-ABE UNDER THE BML MODEL
A CP-ABE scheme which is resilient to bounded memory
leakage attacks uses the four algorithms (Setup, KeyGen,
Encryption, Decryption) as constituents. A security param-
eter κ and a description of attribute universe set U are used
as inputs in the Setup algorithm, the corresponding outputs
are system public parameters pp and master secret keys msk .
pp is the common input of four algorithms. The KeyGen
algorithm inputs msk and an attribute value vi,xi ∈ S and
outputs a secret key skvi,xi . The Encryption algorithm takes
a message m, and an access structure 0(Ǎ, ρ) over the uni-
verse of attributes as input and the ciphertexts CT as output.
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We assume that (Ǎ, {Ii′}i′∈[l]) is implicitly included in CT ,
where Ii′ is the attribute name of the ρ(i′). In the Decryption
algorithm, the inputs are ciphertexts CT and the private keys
skvi,xi for vi,xi ∈ S, the output is a message m on the under-
standing that the attribute set S corresponding to the private
keys skS satisfies the access structure 0(Ǎ, ρ) embedded the
ciphertexts CT .
Next, a CP-ABE scheme with LR-IND-sAP-CPA security
and a schemewith ANON-LR-IND-sAP-CPA security can be
modeled as the following games completed by an adversary
A and a challenger C interaction respectively. The specific
process of games are described as follows:
Definition 2 (LR-IND-sAP-CPA Security): A CP-ABE
scheme is LR-IND-sAP-CPA secure with leakage rate ρm if
there is only a negligible advantage in the following game
for A.
• Initialize: A sends the challenge access policy
0∗(A∗, ρ∗) to C. Then (pp,msk) are generated by C
running Setup, the pp is sent to A.
• KeyGen: C runs skv∗i,xi ←KeyGen(msk, v
∗




• Phase 1: A adaptively performs the following queries.
– KeyGen queries vi,xi 6∈ {ρ
∗(i′)}i′∈[l]: C returns
skvi,xi =KeyGen(msk, vi,xi ) to A.
– Leakage queries (leak, ˇvi,xi , f ): C returns f (sk ˇvi,xi )
to A with the restriction that |f (sk ˇvi,xi )| ≤ ρm
|sk ˇvi,xi |, where ˇvi,xi ∈ {ρ
∗(i′)}i′∈[l] maybe hold in
this queries, and f is a leakage function family.
• Challenge:A sends twomessagesm0,m1 (|m0| = |m1|)
to C, then C sends back CT ∗b ←Encryption(mb, 0∗
(A∗, ρ∗)) for b ∈R {0, 1}.
• Phase 2: A asks C some additional KeyGen queries
about vi,xi , where vi,xi 6∈ {ρ
∗(i′)}i′∈[l]. Then C answers
in the same manner as above.
• Guess: A finally outputs a guess b′ about b. If b′ and b
are equal, A is successful.
Definition 3 (ANON-LR-IND-sAP-CPA Security): A
CP-ABE scheme is ANON-IND-sAP-CPA secure with leak-
age rate ρm if A has only negligible advantage.











1 ) to C. Then C generates (pp,msk)
through Setup, A gets pp sent by C.
• KeyGen: C runs skv∗i,xi ←KeyGen(msk, v
∗








• Phase 1: The following queries are performed adap-
tively by A.
– KeyGen queries (vi,xi 6∈ {ρ
∗
0 (i
′)}i′∈[l]) ∧ (vi,xi 6∈
{ρ∗1 (i
′)}i′∈[l]): C returns skvi,xi =KeyGen(msk, vi,xi )
to A.
– Leakage queries (leak, ˇvi,xi , f ): C returns f (sk ˇvi,xi )








hold in this queries.
• Challenge: Two messages m0,m1 which has same
length selected by A are transmitted to C, then C sends






b )) for b ∈R
{0, 1}.
• Phase 2:Amakes additionalKeyGen queries about vi,xi ,
where (vi,xi 6∈ {ρ
∗
0 (i





′)}. Then C answers in the same manner as above.
• Guess: Eventually, A outputs his guess b′ about b. A
will succeed if b′ = b.
The advantage of A in the above two games is defined as
Adv = |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 |.
III. CONCRETE CONSTRUCTIONS
A. LR-CP-ABE WITH LEAKAGE RATE 1 − o(1)
The LR-CP-ABE consists of four algorithms: Setup, KeyGen,




2: Output: pp and msk
3: Fix l̃ ≥ 3
4: Choose a collusion-resistent hash function
H : {0, 1}∗→ Zp
and define
F(vi,j) = [A0|A1 + H (vi,j) · A0B] ∈ Z2×2l̃p
for each attribute value vi,j ∈ {0, 1}∗
5: Keep the system master secret keys
msk = 〈A0,A1〉
where the matrices A0,A1 ∈R Z2×l̃p
6: Return the system public parameters
pp = 〈gA0 , gA1 ,B, gD〉
where B ∈R Zl̃×l̃p and D ∈R Z2×1p
Algorithm 2 KeyGen
1: Input: pp, msk and S
2: Output: private keys skS
3: for vi,xi ∈ S do
4: Choose a random vector vvi,xi ∈ Z
2l̃×1
p such that





7: Return the private keys skS as follows
skS = 〈{skvi,xi }vi,xi∈S〉
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Algorithm 3 Encryption
1: Input: pp, 0(Ǎ, ρ) and m
2: Output: the ciphertexts CT
3: Select ω = (s, ω2, ω3, . . . , ωn)T ∈ Znp, z ∈ Z1×2p at
random
4: Compute e = ê(g, g)sz·D · m
5: for i′ ∈ [l] do
6: Compute
ci′ = gǍi′ ·ω·z·F(ρ(i
′))
7: end for
8: Return the ciphertexts CT of the message m
CT = 〈Ǎ, {Ii′}i′∈[l], e, {ci′}i′∈[l]〉
Algorithm 4 Decryption
1: Input: pp, CT and skρ(i′) for ρ(i′) ∈ S
2: Output: a symbol ‘‘ ⊥’’ or a message m
3: Compute the constant coefficient list {µi′}i′∈I that∑
i′∈I µi′ Ǎi′ = (1, 0, . . . , 0) and the index set I
4: for i′ ∈ I do








i′ = ê(g, g)
sz·D
8: Compute m = e/k
9: Return the message m or ‘‘ ⊥’’
1) TRAPDOOR
After receiving the challenge access policy 0∗(A∗, ρ∗), B
generates the matrice A1 instead of as above, suppose that
A1 = A0Rv∗i,xi
− H (v∗i,xi )A0B,
where v∗i,xi ∈ {ρ
∗(i′)}i′∈[l], Rv∗i,xi
∈R Zl̃×l̃p is the trapdoor
used in the security proofs. A1 is also random because Rv∗i,xi
is random. Then we can compute skvi,xi = g
vvi,xi from pp
and Rv∗i,xi
for any attribute values (vi,xi 6= v
∗
i,xi ) ∧ (vi,xi 6∈
{ρ∗(i′)}i′∈[l]) as follows: choose a random matrice w ∈ Zl̃×1p
and a random vector y ∈ Zl̃×1p such that
(H (vi,xi )− H (v
∗
i,xi ))A0By = −A0w+ D. (2)
Obviously, it is not difficult to calculate gy from B, gA0
and gD contained in public parameters pp. We set vvi,xi =[
w− Rv∗i,xi y y
]T
and use gy to compute g
vvi,xi . This vvi,xi














= A0(w− Rv∗i,xi y)+ (A0Rv
∗
i,xi








It can be seen from above that the vvi,xi is correctly distributed
whose dimension is 2l̃ − 2. Furthermore, the dimension of
w is l̃ and the freedom of solution space is l̃ − 2 in Eq.(2)
since A0B ∈ Z2×l̃p . Therefore, the set of above vvi,xi and the
solution space of Eq.(1) are equal in practice since there is
l̃ + (l̃ − 2) = 2l̃ − 2.
Theorem 1: The scheme is IND-sAP-CPA secure based on






for ζ -bits. The overhead of private keys and
ciphertexts are 2l̃|S| and 2l l̃ respectively.
Proof: Let Game0 be the real attack game described in
Definition 3. However, some conceptual changes have been
made to generate the public parameters
pp = (gA0 , gA1 ,B, gD).
Set A1 as follows:
A1 = A0Rv∗i,xi
− H (v∗i,xi )A0B, (3)
in which A0 ∈R Z2×l̃p and B,Rv∗i,xi ∈R Z
l̃×l̃
p . Next, set





+ (H (ρ∗(i′))− H (v∗i,xi ))A0B
]
.
As a result, D is also uniformly distributed, where
vρ∗(i′) ∈R Z2l̃×1p .
Game1 and Game0 are similar except that the ciphertext
component c∗i′ is randomly chosen. Then we prove the theo-
rem by the following three lemmas.
Lemma 3: Game1 and Game0 are indistinguishable under
the DLIN assumption, ignoring leakage queries.
Proof: Suppose the ABE scheme can be broken by an
adversaryA, then there is a simulator B who uses gA as input
to tell the rank of A ∈ Z3×l̃p is 2 or 3. After A announces
the challenge access structure 0∗(A∗, ρ∗), B sets the public
parameters as follows:
pp = (gA0 , gA1 ,B, gD),
where A0 ∈R Z2×l̃p consists of the first two rows of A, B and
Rv∗i,xi
are randomly selected from Zl̃×l̃p and A1 as in (3). It is
obvious that gA1 can be computed from gA0 . Take note of
F(vi,xi ) =
[














. B chooses vv∗i,xi from
Z2l̃×1p and sets D as in (3), so that gD can be calculated from
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gA0 easily. When A makes the KeyGen queries of vi,xi that
vi,xi 6∈ {ρ
∗(i′)}i′∈[l], B computes and returns g
vvi,xi .
In the challenge phase, A sends two messages m0,m1
(|m0| = |m1|) to B, in response, B randomly chooses b
from {0, 1} and sets y′ as the third row of A, and returns the
ciphertextsCT ∗ = 〈A∗, {Ii′}i′∈[l], {c∗i′}i′∈[l], e
∗
〉 as follows. To
simplify the formula description, the matrice[
y′|y′Rv∗i,xi
+ (H (ρ∗(i′))− H (v∗i,xi ))y
′B
]
is labeled by C, then
c∗i′ = g
A∗i′ωC ,
e∗ = mb · ê(g, g)
svρ∗(i′)C .
Finally,A outputs the guess b′ of b. If b′ = b, B thinks the
rank ofA is 2. Otherwise, it guesses the rank ofA is 3. We can
prove that B simulates the Game0 if rank(A) = 2; Game1 is
simulated when the rank(A) = 3.
Suppose that rank(A) = 2, then y′ and the first two rows
of A are linearly related, that is to say, there exist z∗ ∈ Z1×2p
that makes y′ = z∗A0 hold. Therefore[
y′|y′Rv∗i,xi












+ (H (ρ∗(i′))− H (v∗i,xi ))A0B
]
= z∗ · F(ρ(i′)),
it shows that (e∗, {c∗i′}i′∈[l]) are the ciphertext components
in Game0.
If rank(A) = 3, y′ is a random element in Z1×l̃p , namely,
d = y′Rv∗i,xi
+ (H (ρ(i′)) − H (vi,xi ))y
′B is also a random
element in Z1×l̃p even given A0, U = A0Rv∗i,xi + (H (ρ(i
′))−
H (v∗i,xi ))A0B and y
′. It is easy to find that
A · (Rv∗i,xi






Therefore, the rank ofA is full, if v∗i,xi ∈ {ρ(i
′)}i′∈[l] is selected
for any d , there will be a unique Rv∗i,xi
which makes the
equation true (the probability is negligible). That is to say,
d is as random as Rv∗i,xi
. Same with c∗i′ . As a result, under the
DLIN problem, it is impossible to make a distinction between
Game0 and Game1.
Lemma 4: The advantage of A against the ABE scheme is
negligible under the DLIN assumption.
Proof: Let pi represent the probability Pr[b′ = b] of A
in Gamei for i = 0, 1, so that |p0 − p1| is computationally




First of all, there is c∗i′ = g
A∗i′ω·cρ(i′) for some cρ(i′) ∈ Z1×2l̃p .
Next
e∗ = ê(g, g)scρ(i′)·vρ(i′)mb











In Game1, cρ(i′) is a random element since c∗i′ is random,
so that cρ(i′) ∈ Z1×2l̃p and the two rows of Fρ(i′) are linearly
independent with a non-negligible probability 1/p2l̃ . In other
words, α is a random value even provided cρ(i′),D and Fρ(i′)
because of vρ(i′) is random. So e∗ = ê(g, g)sαmb is random
and |p1 − 12 | ≤
1
p2l̃





| ≤ |p0 − p1| + |p1 −
1
2
| ≤ |p0 − p1| +
1
p2l̃
is negligible under the DLIN assumption.
Lemma 5: The proposed scheme is leakage-resilient.
Proof: Let f : Z2l̃p → Z represent all leakage func-
tions of Leakage queries from A, for the set Z. The pur-
pose is to prove the distributions (cρ(i′), cρ(i′)vρ(i′), f (vρ(i′)))
and (cρ(i′),UZp , f (vρ(i′))) are statistically indistinguishable,
it means that α = cρ(i′)vρ(i′) is indistinguishable with a






the leakage information f (vρ(i′)).
Now reconsider the indiscernibility of the two games with
leakage queries. Because B in the DLIN assumption can
generate vρ(i′), Game0 and Game1 are still indistinguishable
even given f (vρ(i′)). Moreover, cρ(i′) in Game1 is random
over Z1×2l̃p . Set hcρ(i′) (r) = cρ(i′)r maps r ∈ Z
2l̃×1
p to Zp.
The function hcρ(i′) is universal due to Prcρ(i′) [hcρ(i′) (r) =
hcρ(i′) (r
′)] = 1p for r 6= r
′. According to the Lemma 1,
the statistical distance of the above two distributions is at
most 12
√
γ (vρ(i′)) · p · |Z| where γ (vρ(i′)) = maxu∈Z2l̃p
Pr[vρ(i′) = u].
2) ANONYMITY OF THE SELECTIVELY SECURE ABE
Theorem 2: The ABE scheme above mentioned is ANON-
IND-sAP-CPA secure under the DLIN assumption.
Proof:The proof is similar toTheorem 1 and its specific
description is as follows.
Game0 be the real attack game as given in Definition 3,
Game1 is identical with Game0 except that c∗i′ of the chal-
lenge ciphertexts is a random value. The definition of Game2
is as same as that of Game1 besides e∗ in the challenge
ciphertexts is random. So the challenge ciphertexts ofGame2
becomes random under the DLIN assumption, realizing
ANON-IND-sAP-CPA security. The concrete proof process
will be explained by the next two lemmas.
Lemma 6: Game0 and Game1 are indistinguishable under
the DLIN assumption.
Proof: B is similar to that of Theorem 1 except that
A1 = A0Rv∗i,xi,b
− H (v∗i,xi,b)A0B.
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TABLE 4. Efficiency comparisons.
TABLE 5. Efficiency comparsions.
FIGURE 1. Evaluation of efficiency.
in which v∗i,xi,b ∈R {ρ
∗
b (i














and as before v ∈R Z2l̃×1p and
D =
[











′)}i′∈[l]) ∧ (vi,xi 6∈ {ρ
∗
1 (i
′)}i′∈[l]) from A, B
answered basing on the following equation
(H (vi,xi )− H (v
∗
i,xi,b))A0By = −A0w+ D,
where H (vi,xi )− H (v
∗









is unchanged, B is identical with that of Theorem 2. There-
fore, it will not be described here.
Lemma 7: Game1 andGame2 are information-theoretically
indistinguishable.
Proof: From the proof of Theorem 1, we can know that
e∗ = ê(g, g)
scρ∗b (i
′)·vρ∗b (i
′)mb is random owing to the random-











In order to simplify the explanation, let DEPEND be






whose rank is 2, this means that there is û ∈ Zp such that
cρb(i′) = ûF(ρb(i
′))k̃ , where F(ρb(i
′))k̃ denotes the k̃
th row of
F(ρ∗b (i
′)). Because of cρb(i′) ∈ Z1×2l̃p of Game1 and Game2 is
random,







Lemma 7 can be proved, since Game1 and Game2 can be
distinguishable only when DEPEND occurs.
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IV. ANALYSES
A. PERFORMANCE ANALYSES
In this section, analyses on efficiency are given in
Table 4 and 5.
Let the order ofG andGT in scheme [16], [21], [22], [24],
[25] be N =
∏3
i=1 pi, where pi (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) is large primes
of di (di = ciκ) bits. c, ci (i = 1, 2, 3) are any positive
constants. ñ denotes the leakage parameter. ε is a constant sat-
isfied with 0 < ε < 1. m̌ denotes the number of minimal sets.
The number of elements in attribute vectors is represented by
k . Comparing our scheme with schemes [16], [21]–[25] in
terms of the length of private keys and ciphertexts, the time of
key generation, encryption and decryption in Table 4 and 5,
one can find that our scheme has advantage in private key
length and ciphertext length over the others. In addition, our
scheme has lower cost in decryption. From the analyses above
mentioned, our scheme is more practical than the rest of the
table.
B. EXPERIMENTS ANALYSES
We will analyze the experimental results by using the PBC
library. The experiment is on a 64-bits PC with Intel Core
i5-6300 CPU(2.4GHz) and 8GB of RAM. To achieve better
performance of leakage resilience, we set N in schemes [16],
[21], [22], [25] is a number of 1024-bits, the order p of the
proposed scheme is a number of 170-bits. To achieve the
balance of efficiency and leakage rate, we set ñ = 5 and l̃ = 3
respectively. And set l = 2 in the simulation of private key
length.
V. CONCLUSIONS
As an important encryption primitive, CP-ABE has attracted
much attention in the setting of key leakage attacks. However,
the leakage rate of most of the existing schemes is low and
dependent on the number of attributes. It is a challenge to
design a scheme with high leakage rate at present. In this
paper, we proposed a scheme with the leakage rate about
1−o(1) by using the trapdoor technique. The scheme is based
on DLIN assumption in the selective access policy model and
achieves anonymity which can protect the privacy of users.
In addition, our scheme is built in a group of prime order that
more efficient than the construction of composite order. How
to design a more efficient scheme is left as the future work.
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